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Monastic governance: forgotten prospects for public institutions
Abstract
To overcome agency problems, public sector reforms started to introduce businesslike incentive
structures to motivate public officials. By neglecting internal behavioral incentives, however, these
reforms often do not reach their stated goals. Our research analyzes the governance structure of
Benedictine monasteries in order to gain new insights into solving agency problems in public
institutions. A comparison is useful because members of both organizational forms, public organizations
and monasteries, see themselves as responsible participants in their community and claim to serve the
public good. We study monastic governance from an economic perspective. Benedictine monasteries in
Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland have an average lifetime of almost
500 years, and only a quarter of them broke up because of agency problems. We argue that they were
able to survive for centuries due to an appropriate governance structure, relying strongly on the intrinsic
motivation of the members and internal control mechanisms. This governance approach differs in
several aspects from current public sector reforms.
JEL Classification: D73, G3, Z12, H83
Keywords: Public Governance, New Public Management, Public Sector Reform, Psychological
Economics, Agency Problems, Monasteries, Benedictine Order 
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I. WHY ARE MONASTERIES OF INTEREST FOR PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT? 
Reforms of the public sector have been on the political agenda for more than 20 years, and 
the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm initially guided the ideas. Its core idea is that 
public sector organizations need to be more businesslike in their attitudes and operations 
(Hood, 1991; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Osborne & Plastrik, 2000). This concept “marked a 
radical shift from a public service whose purpose was to promote public welfare to an 
enterprise culture based on efficiency and economy” (Mascarenhas, 1993, 319). The reforms 
were characterized by the adoption of instruments originally developed for the business 
sector, for example, budgeting techniques, market analysis, and performance management 
(Box, 1999; Henkel, 1997; McVicar, 1992; Miller, 1995; Sotirakou, 2004; Thorne & 
Cuthbert, 1996; Williams, 1994) or pay for performance schemes (Metcalf, 2008; Reingold, 
2008; Verhoest, 2005). NPM principles are intended to change the way public sector 
organizations are controlled and public sector employees are motivated. 
 However, it soon became apparent that practices employed in the private sector could 
not easily be transferred to the public sector. For public sector organizations, many of the 
suggested external incentives have led to problems (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Bertelli, 2006; 
Bogh Andersen, 2007; Bumgarner & Newswander, 2007; Hood, 2006; Klingner et al., 2002). 
These problems are similar to those encountered in private business environments (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2004; Jensen et al., 2004; Stefani, 2008, Zingales, 2009), that is incentive distortion, 
gaming behavior, or motivation crowding out. For example, teachers tend to “teach to the 
test” when their salary is coupled with their students’ performances (Wragg et al. 2004); the 
practical wisdom of decision makers is suppressed (Kane and Patapan 2006), or the strong 
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crowding out of intrinsic motivation with the introduction of pay-for-performance in the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service (Bertelli 2006).1 
 As a reaction, new models guiding public sector reforms were developed, such as the 
“New Public Service” model (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000; Perry, 2007) and the “Integrated 
Governance” model (Halligan, 2007). These new approaches explicitly highlight their 
differences to the original ideas of NPM. For example, the New Public Service model 
embraces the idea of a public service dealing with “citizens,” whereas NPM would speak of 
“customers” conveying its market orientation. The Integrated Governance model follows 
NPM with respect to performance improvement and business world tools (e.g., project 
management) but proposes a stronger focus on centralization and cooperation. While 
producing substantial progress, these new models still emphasize the use of external 
mechanisms to control public sector organization at the cost of neglecting internal aspects of 
governance. 
 This paper suggests that we learn from the monastic approach. Such an approach 
shows that internal control mechanisms can fruitfully complement external controls. 
Monasteries implemented organizational structures that were likely to secure appropriate 
selection, including socialization as well as compliance to a common value system. They also 
kept their monks motivated by granting them sufficient participation rights. The work of 
Denhardt & Denhardt (2000) is the inspiration for Table 1, which depicts NPM, two 
successors, and the monastic governance approach on relevant dimensions for this paper. In 
particular, Table 1 shows that models guiding public sector reforms put less emphasis on 
internal control and on serving society. We address the commonalities and differences of the 
monastic governance approach in the remaining parts of this paper. 
                                                 
1
 NPM principles have not been applied in the same manner globally. For example, the U.S., UK, Australia, and 
New Zealand are considered early adopters of NPM reforms, while other nations such as Germany still apply a 
more traditional approach that has been termed the “Neo-Weberian State” (see, e.g., Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004; 
Boin et al., 2006; Halligan, 2007; Pollitt et al., 2007; Kickert, 2008). When comparing the different waves of 
public sector reform, NPM is still the relevant benchmark guiding reform initiatives (Kuhlmann et al., 2008). 
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Take in Table (No.1) 
 
 In their history, the Benedictine Order had to deal with similar agency problems as 
public service management. Studying the governance of the Benedictines therefore may 
provide relevant insights for the public service literature and contribute to new approaches 
guiding public sector reforms. We do not intend to proffer a one-to-one transfer of monastic 
governance mechanisms or to compare and appraise the institutions in their entirety. Instead, 
we consider some concepts that may also be relevant to governance structures in 
administrative organizations. 
 In the following, we present an analysis of the governance system of a particular 
religious order, the Benedictines.2 The Benedictine Order provides an interesting 
environment, since it has been successful for a long time and can be considered an archetype 
of public sector organizations (Berman, 1983; Crislip, 2005; Lindberg, 2008; McGrath, 2007; 
Moulin, 1965; Weber, 1930). In a seminal paper, Kieser (1987, 103) analyses Benedictine 
monasteries and describes them as the “first deliberately designed organization in the 
Occident.” The great economic success of numerous monasteries in medieval times serves as 
an example of an efficient organization. However, the creation of wealth led to the temptation 
of misuse. For example, some abbots and monks lined their own pockets, and certain 
monasteries were undisciplined. Some monasteries became very rich through their rational 
labor organization (e.g., the division of labor) and their work morale. The resulting wealth 
was a significant reason why governance became important. 
                                                 
2
 Our analysis is related to the economics of religion (for an overview see Azzi & Ehrenberg, 1975; Held et al., 
2007; Iannaconne, 1998; McCleary & Barro, 2006; Miller, 2002; Ferrero 2002, Stark & Finke, 2000).  
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 In the next chapters, we discuss the efficiency of monastic control mechanisms by 
empirically analyzing how Benedictine abbeys approach their specific governance problems.3 
In a historic analysis of crises, we ask if Benedictine monasteries were and are capable of 
solving agency problems. If so, how are they doing this, and what are the insights for public 
organizations? As we will show, monasteries address their agency problems in a different 
way than suggested in the NPM approach and the subsequent models. Monastic leaders are 
mainly disciplined through internal control mechanisms, like selection tools, value systems, 
or participation rights. Internal behavioral incentives are complemented with external 
mechanisms, which primarily serve as a support and not as a monitoring instrument. We 
argue that recent public sector reforms, especially those focusing on NPM, insufficiently 
consider internal behavioral incentives and their interaction with external control. They 
therefore may fail to capture the resultant levels and changes in behavior. By underestimating 
such things as loyalty and trust this type of governance neither protects organization-specific 
investments nor the intrinsic motivation of public sector employees (see the literature on 
public service motivation, e.g., Crewson, 1997; Moynihan, 2008; Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; 
Perry, 1997; Perry & Hondeghem, 2008; Perry et al., 2006; Perry & Wise, 1990, Ritz 2009). 
Additionally, such governance may damage the image of the civil servant, who is expected to 
be the steward of a public good, and it may damage the public service ethos (Horton, 2006, 
2008).4 
 Monasteries pursued their own agenda; they point to possible directions to mitigate 
the weaknesses of public sector reforms and to complement these reforms. 
                                                 
3
 We refer to Benedictine abbeys, which are autonomous monasteries within the Benedictine Order. Where no 
specific abbeys are mentioned, we use the more common term monastery. This term is broader and also includes 
affiliated houses. 
4
 For a contrary view see Van der Wal & Huberts (2008) 
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II. CAN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS LEARN FROM BENEDICTINE MONASTERIES? 
Worldwide, a vast number of religious orders exist. The selection of the Benedictine Order 
makes sense for the following reasons. Benedictine monasteries belong to the oldest and most 
steady institutions in the Catholic Church. They have greatly influenced the development of 
Western economics and work ethics (Faust, 1997; Kieser, 1987; Moulin, 1965). Up to today, 
the Benedictines have been the most powerful and largest monastic order (Schwaiger & 
Heim, 2008; Hostie, 1972; Annuario Pontificio, 2005). The autonomy of the particular 
monasteries without centralistic governance leads to well-defined entities, facilitating a 
consistent analysis. Further, the practices and the emergence of the Benedictine governance 
system are well documented, and the emphasis on work and service duties beside spirituality 
(“ora et labora”) makes it a strong case beyond the religious field. 
 The question arises whether a comparison between monastic institutions and public 
organizations is useful. In the following section, we explain why such a comparison is 
promising. On the one hand, it is obvious that there are fundamental differences between 
monastic organizations and public administration organizations. To mention the most 
important, the padres and brothers constitute a life partnership, where faith is of crucial 
relevance (e.g., Reiber 2003). On the other hand, the basic principles of organizing are 
similar. For Benedictine institutions, as well as for other organizations, the purpose is an 
efficient achievement of their objectives as set by a principal (Kieser & Walgenbach, 2007). 
However, the similarities go far beyond comparing basic principles. Various substantial 
affinities exist. 
 First, to ensure an efficient target achievement, inefficiencies (agency problems such 
as luxury consumption, idleness, or fraudulence) have to be reduced. These negative aspects 
show some similarities to the deficits of public administration organizations. A core problem 
is that individuals holding leading positions tend to accumulate uncontrolled discretion (Berle 
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& Means, 1932). In monasteries, there is no possibility of distributing the wealth accumulated 
(Hansmann, 1980), but there is a strong incentive to make life as luxurious and enjoyable as 
possible. In the long history of monasteries, it was common for abbots and even entire 
monasteries to live a life of luxury (Helvetia Sacra, 1986; Kieser, 1987). In public 
organizations, there is the possibility of damaging taxpayers through opportunism, for 
example, by misallocating state funds or by staying on the job even when employees are no 
longer competent or qualified. Whistleblowers regularly report such misbehavior in public 
sector organizations (Cropf, 2008; Jos et al., 1989). 
 Second, the Benedictine institutions are not only considered an archetype of religious 
orders (Schwaiger & Heim, 2008) but of public sector organizations as well (Tilgher, 1930).5 
The two organizational forms have a lot in common with respect to purpose and self-
conception. They share many common roots, which are apparent to this day. Monastic 
governance had a major impact on public structures and institutions. Monasteries in medieval 
times were pioneers in the development of constitutional law and political institutions 
(Berman, 1983; Moulin, 1965), healthcare (Crislip, 2005), and education (Lindberg, 2008; 
McGrath, 2007).6 These sources are visible in the distinctive service attitude of the 
Benedictines, expressed by religious, educational, and cultural offers and services. 
Benedictine institutions are not legitimized politically or democratically, but they aim at 
“building a school for God” (Regula Benedicti, 2006) and engaging in a “Kingdom of God.” 
For a Benedictine monk, “serving for God” is equivalent to “serving the people” (Regula 
Benedicti, 2006). Members of both organizational forms see themselves as responsible 
                                                 
5
 During the medieval period after the fall of the Roman Empire, the Catholic understanding of work evolved. In 
contrast to early Christianity, wealth now was recognized as an opportunity to share. This development also 
changed the self-image of Catholic institutions. In particular, in Benedictine monasteries, the generation of 
wealth is viewed as a common good, which has to be shared within the community (Braude, 1975). This 
understanding corresponds with the mission of public institutions. 
6
 Appropriate approaches depend on the circumstances, such as the value being produced or the nature of the 
task (Alford & Hughes, 2008). Therefore, we limit the comparison of monasteries with public service 
organizations to branches like education, healthcare, and municipal administration, which have a relationship to 
the local community and a clear service commitment similar to the Benedictines. We do not consider 
organizations such as the police, military, or national parliaments. 
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participants of society and claim to serve the public good. Consequently, they share a 
nonprofit orientation. Closely connected with the purpose is motivation: Intrinsic motivation 
can be found in both monasteries and the public sector (Perry et al., 2008). Monks have a 
strong intrinsic motivation in their search and glorification of God (Schweizer 
Benediktinerkongregation, 1986). Similarly, public service employees have been shown to be 
driven by a strong desire to contribute to society (Crewson, 1997; Cropf, 2008; Houston, 
2000; Perry et al., 2008; Rainey et al., 1976). When intrinsic motivation is high, there is 
always the danger that external control (e.g., due to the introduction of pay-for-performance) 
can backfire and reduce the agents’ performance or compliance with the rules. Such crowding 
out of intrinsic motivation has been suggested by psychological economics (for an overview, 
see Frey & Benz, 2004) and motivational psychology (for an overview, see Deci & Ryan, 
2000a, 2000b). This literature is also the basis for the research on Public Service Motivation 
(Perry & Hondeghem, 2008) and for the “New Public Service” model (Denhardt & Denhardt, 
2000). In a similar way, combining intrinsic motivation and control is the core of monastic 
governance. 
III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION: THREE BASIC CONCEPTS 
Our aim is to investigate empirically whether monasteries succeeded by developing efficient 
governance mechanisms to constrain bad abbots and their exercise of uncontrolled discretion 
and if it is possible to derive relevant conclusions for the governance of public institutions. In 
order to do so, we outline the basic concepts relevant for monastic governance. We first 
briefly consider Agency Theory because it inspired both public management reforms and our 
analysis largely (Ferlie et al., 1996; Kaboolian, 1998; Pollitt et al., 2007). 
 Agency theory, which is still the dominant theoretical approach within governance 
literature, suggests using external control mechanisms to solve agency problems (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Murphy, 1990a; Jensen & 
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Murphy, 1990b). Public organizations receive their resources from taxpayers, and the 
interests of public organizations may not necessarily coincide with those of absent taxpayers. 
To overcome these agency problems, proponents of NPM reforms argue that public 
organizations should be managed by performance criteria and extrinsic incentives (Becher & 
Kogan, 1994; Jarratt, 1985; Lewis & Altbach, 1996; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The 
“market-aligned” public organization applies performance-based budgeting in which the 
received taxpayer resources are sold to customers (Sotirakou, 2004; Williams, 1994). 
However, the theory tends to constrain the attention to a narrow and empirically questionable 
view of human motivation, the classical homo oeconomicus (Frey, 1999). 
Such a constrained view of human motivation is not helpful when designing new guidelines 
for organizational reforms in the public sector. Successors of NPM acknowledge this by 
explicitly referring to the concept of public service motivation (see. e.g., Denhardt & 
Denhardt, 2000). However, they do not tell us how a government should look that fosters this 
kind of motivation. The monastic approach is able to fill this gap and therefore delivers 
important insights for designing public sector organizations. 
 In the following, we highlight several theories that are relevant building blocks for the 
analysis of monastic governance and which significantly depart from the assumptions of the 
classical economic model. These theories are psychological economics, embeddedness 
theory, and political economics. The first approach focuses on motivation; the second is 
concerned with selection and socialization, and the third addresses voice and participation 
issues. 
A. Psychological Economics 
The assumption of rationality is the foundation of standard economic theory. This viewpoint 
stands in sharp contrast to the view of cognitive psychology: Individuals often act in a less 
than fully rational and self-serving manner (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & 
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Kahneman, 1973, 1974, 1992). Psychological economics picks up this criticism by starting 
with the assumptions of bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest 
(for an overview, see Frey & Benz, 2004). Psychological economics considers these 
systematic deviations from the behavior of homo oeconomicus.7 
 Important sub theories in our context are such matters as fairness-reciprocity theory 
(Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk et al., 2003; Rabin, 1993) or the relevance of social 
(dis)approval (e.g. Akerlof, 1980; Fehr & Falk, 2002). Largely, individuals react based on 
their beliefs about other people’s intentions. From this perspective, common value systems 
signal friendly intentions and “people feel obligated to respond to positive behavior received 
with positive behavior in return” (Groves et al., 1992, 480). Control and supervisory 
institutions, on the other hand, are more likely to signal neutral (economic exchange related) 
or even “unfriendly” intentions in the sense that these might signal distrust or insinuate the 
selfish nature of the employees (McGregor, 1960; Osterloh & Weibel, 2006). The empirical 
literature supports these insights. Beliefs about fairness matter (Blount, 1995; Cox, 2004; 
Falk et. al, 2003; Sobel, 2005). An appropriate design of values, which fosters social 
approval, makes individuals happier and affects their behavior (for an overview, see Fehr & 
Falk, 2002; Gächter & Fehr, 1999). 
The incomplete contract literature emphasizes that in complex environments, such as 
organizations, complete contracts cannot be written or enforced (Heinrich & Choi, 2007; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Therefore, honesty, intrinsic job satisfaction, and intrinsic 
motivation lead to better results from the contracted parties than relying on monitoring or 
monetary incentives (Gintis & Khurana, 2006; Jensen, 2006). Experiments confirm that 
employees exert more effort if labor contracts are regarded primarily as a “gift exchange” 
                                                 
7
 We prefer the expression “psychological economics” rather than “behavioral economics” for two reasons. 
First, economists had already examined human behavior before this new field emerged. Second, Simon (1985) 
points out that the term “behavioral” is misleading because it may be confounded with the “behaviorist” 
approach in psychology. 
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rather than as a disciplinary tool (Akerlof, 1982; Irlenbusch & Sliwka, 2003). As far as 
knowledge work is concerned, “management by intrinsic motivation” is crucial to ensure 
high performance of the organization (Frey & Osterloh, 2002; Osterloh et al., 2002). 
 The assumptions of psychological economics affect external control too. In contrast to 
other forms of external control mechanisms (e.g., pay-for-performance), supportive control 
does not reduce intrinsic motivation. The crowding out of intrinsic motivation only occurs if 
people perceive an external intervention as controlling and hence as reducing their self-
determination (with respect to the public sector, compare Bertelli, 2006; Bogh Andersen, 
2007; for an overview, compare Deci et al., 1999; Frey & Jegen, 2001). 
B. Embeddedness Theory 
The embeddedness approach investigates how the behavior of economic actors is affected by 
social relations (Baker, 1990; Granovetter, 1985; Lubatkin et al., 2007; Uzzi, 1996). Since 
purposive actions are embedded in ongoing systems of social relations, such systems contain 
valuable information about one’s own past. This happens in collaboration with the individual 
or through information from a trusted source that has dealt with that person and found him or 
her trustworthy. In contrast to second-hand information (e.g., certifications or testimonials), 
this information is less expensive, richer, more detailed, and accurate. First-hand information 
therefore enables the selection of trustworthy individuals. For example, professional 
consultants, like the Boston Consulting Group or McKinsey, successfully practice the 
embeddedness approach as a selection tool in order to find suitable, trustworthy employees. 
Promotion decisions are fully dependent on first-hand information from numerous individuals 
about the behavior of a candidate. Further, a practiced culture of values is essential to reduce 
agency problems. Embedding the actors promotes the successful socialization of these values; 
for example, employees spread them via relationships and networks. 
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C. Political Economics  
According to political economics, the voice of employees (i.e., relying on inside monitoring 
and comprehensive participation rights) is important in preventing agency problems. 
Employees have personal experience with managers and are thus highly suitable for selecting 
and controlling the management (Benz & Frey, 2007; Hirschman, 1970). Democratic 
constitutions actively promote the principle of checks and balances. This may not prevent 
some persons or branches from dominating for a period of time, but it ensures that other 
persons or branches can reassert themselves in due time (Frey, 1983). Democratic election 
systems create strong competition for filling open positions (Benz & Frey, 2007; Schelker & 
Eichenberger, 2004). Finally, employees invest in organization-specific knowledge (Osterloh 
& Frey, 2006). These investments cannot be protected (except at a high cost) ex ante when 
the parties enter into a relationship. However, the most relevant asset for any organization is 
organization-specific knowledge, which needs to be generated, accumulated, transferred, and 
protected (Foss & Foss, 2000; Grandori & Kogut, 2002; Penrose, 1959). Voice delivers 
incentives to invest in organization-specific knowledge. 
 Before focusing on the governance of monasteries with these concepts, we ask if 
monastic institutions are capable of solving their agency problems. Only if they are 
succeeding is an analysis justified. 
IV. ARE MONASTERIES ABLE TO SOLVE THEIR AGENCY PROBLEMS? 
In both the public and the private sector, an important function of governance is to control 
and discipline management in order to ensure efficient business routines (Daily et al., 2003). 
The same goal is shared by the Holy See and the umbrella organizations of the religious 
orders where disciplining abbots and their convents is a central task (Schmidtchen & Mayer, 
1997). 
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 Our research starts with an analysis of the Benedictine abbey of Engelberg 
(Switzerland), which encompasses 900 years of history. A case study of this monastery 
shows that governance mechanisms on a monastery level are successful if they are indeed 
applied (Inauen et al., 2009). In the history of the monastery of Engelberg, many forms of 
incompetence and fraud can be found (Heer 1975). The case study illustrates that abbots 
democratically elected by the convent had fewer agency problems. External influences on 
elections undermine good governance by promoting poorly performing abbots. In addition to 
codetermination, there existed selection and socialization mechanisms to discipline abbots. 
Good abbots had a longer tenure than unsuccessful ones. They accomplished demanding 
tasks before they were elected, and they were socialized within the monastery. The results 
suggest that only 6 percent of the competent but 79 percent of the poorly performing abbots 
had a weak or inconspicuous record of accomplishment. Further, only 18 percent of the good 
but 40 percent of the poor abbots were outsiders from other monasteries. The study also 
shows that the shortcomings and failures of the abbots had serious consequences, sometimes 
even threatening the existence of the monastery (Heer 1975). The monastery of Engelberg 
impressively accentuates the necessity of institutions supporting internal governance. 
 To check the results of the case study with a larger sample of monasteries, general 
indicators were developed. Using the survival rates of monasteries and the reasons for their 
dissolution allows us to evaluate the Benedictine governance system as a whole (Rost et al. 
2009). In order to analyze these indicators, data were collected on all Benedictine abbeys that 
ever existed in Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, and German-speaking Switzerland. Our sample 
covers 134 monasteries: 19 in Switzerland, 35 in Baden-Württemberg, and 80 in Bavaria. 
Data for this analysis were obtained from historical chronicles (Germania Benedictina, 1970, 
1975, 1999; Helvetia Sacra, 1986) and the Website of the House of Bavarian History (2007). 
Institutions, which were closed down and then reopened, are counted as separate 
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organizations. For this reason, the number of monasteries increased to 151. As of 2008, the 
134 abbeys had an average lifetime of 463 years. This is the first indication of efficient 
governance in Benedictine monasteries. 
Take in Table (No.2) 
 
 Table 2 analyzes the reasons for closures. The table lists 119 institutions after the year 
1000 AD and ignores temporary closures, which implies 151 foundations. Two percent of the 
monasteries were never closed. Four percent of the monasteries voluntarily closed. Quite a 
few monasteries disbanded because of institutional factors, 52.3 percent to be exact. These 
monasteries fell victim to secularization or were violently dissolved during the Reformation. 
Other events such as a peasant revolt or the plague also led to break ups and forced 
shutdowns. Endogenous factors, such as the excessive amassing of wealth during 
secularization or loss of reputation during the Reformation, might have influenced the 
political climate against the monasteries, thus contributing to the closures. In the end, the 
monastic institutions and their members had little or no influence on the outcome of these 
incidents. Closures occurred regardless of how good the monastic management was. Hence, 
we simply speak of external institutional factors. Focusing on agency problems, 13.2 percent 
of the monasteries broke up due to mismanagement, including lack of discipline, insolvency, 
or recruitment problems. An analysis of particular monasteries shows that the breakups were 
mainly due to a combination of all three factors. Six percent disappeared due to control 
failures, including hostile takeovers. The changes in governance structures are revealing - 
over 7 percent of the monasteries studied changed into collegiate churches. Mainly, these 
changes indicate the monastic leaders’ desire for wealth because collegiate churches permit 
private ownership and other liberties. As shown in Table 2, monasteries unable to survive due 
to agency problems (40 monasteries or 26.5 percent) have a shorter average lifetime (387, 
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313, and 325 years) than those that dissolved because of external institutional influences or 
were voluntarily liquidated (568 and 540 years). 
 Figure 1a shows the number of existing monasteries and collegiate churches over 
time. One can see that the Benedictines never recovered from the dissolutions during the 
Reformation in the 16th century and Secularization in the 19th century. In the 20th century, 
the number of monasteries slowly began to rise again. A survival analysis underlines the 
extraordinary stability of the Benedictine institutions. Figure 1b shows the probability of 
survival. After 500 years of existence, the chance of survival is one-half; after 1000 years, it 
is still more than 10 percent. We do not know of any comparable local organizations 
(including other religious orders) with such a performance record. In the U.S., for example, 
half of the companies listed at some time between 1978 and 2004 had been incorporated for 
less than 23 years. Fewer than 10 percent of them made it past 83 years, and the oldest was 
280 years old (Fama & French, 2004). Again, it is worth looking at the Benedictine history 
with a special focus on agency problems. Hardly surprising is the fact that monasteries, which 
disappeared because of agency problems, show a considerably reduced survival rate in Figure 
1b. The survival estimate decreases rapidly when approaching the 500-year mark. Finally, 
Figure 1a indicates that functioning governance structures are hard to maintain under difficult 
circumstances. Governance changes from monasteries to collegiate churches were most 
prominent when the monasteries were economically weak and discipline failed, which is 
what occurred during the wars of the 10th century and the Reformation. 
Take in Figure (No.1a/b) 
 
 To sum up, in the history of the Benedictine Order, a selection occurred. A maximum 
of one quarter (26.5 percent) of the monasteries did not survive due to agency problems. The 
vast majority of monastic houses were closed because of external institutional factors or they 
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still exist today. Considering the survival rate, we conclude that the Benedictine Order is a 
special case indeed. An average lifetime of almost 500 years indicates crisis-proof, effective 
governance mechanisms. The qualitative and quantitative historical analyses show that the 
Benedictines are capable of adjusting their institutions with regard to agency problems. We 
show in particular that the monastery of Engelberg adapted an efficient governance system 
with an emphasis on internal governance mechanisms. These findings apply to the 
Benedictine Order as a whole. 
 The next section examines these governance mechanisms. Agency problems seem to 
be negligible in today’s Benedictine monasteries. This can be attributed to a special external 
control and its interplay with internal control. 
V. THE BENEDICTINE WAY TO SOLVE AGENCY PROBLEMS 
Why do Benedictine monasteries survive so well and seldom fall prey to mismanagement, 
hostile takeovers, or change of governance? This section introduces the specific governance 
of the Benedictines in detail. Because there is hardly any literature on the governance of 
monasteries, the following sources were used: rules, laws, and constitutions of abbeys and 
congregations and several expert interviews.8 As the next chapter refers to an exemplary 
monastery of today, a historical analysis shows that the basic governance instruments were 
established very early (see, in detail, Inauen & Frey, 2008). The first paragraph argues that 
monasteries build on strong internal control by applying a common value system, careful 
selection, socialization, participation, and monitoring. The second paragraph points out that 
the Benedictines backed up their internal arrangements with external arrangements such as 
periodic monitoring or jurisdiction. Figure 2 presents a graphical overview of the governance 
of a Benedictine monastery. 
                                                 
8
 We held interviews with Guido Muff (prior of the Abbey of Engelberg), Gregor Jäggi (historian in the Abbey 
of Einsiedeln), Reto Krismer (managing director of the Abbey of Einsiedeln), Thaddäus Schreiber (padre in the 
Abbey of Ettal), Wolfgang Gehra (managing director of the Abbey of Plankstetten), and Benno Malfèr 
(archabbot and supreme visitator of the Swiss Benedictine Congregation and abbot of the Abbey of Muri Gries). 
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Take in Figure (No. 2) 
A. Internal Governance Mechanisms 
Internal control in the Benedictine monasteries can be divided into two main categories. On 
the one hand, monasteries build on common value systems, careful selection, and rigorous 
socialization processes. These arrangements can be explained by embeddedness theory and 
psychological economics. On the other hand, monasteries grant participation rights to their 
monks and build largely on internal monitoring processes. Participation rights are in line with 
the recommendations of political economics. These internal monitoring processes in 
monasteries reduce agency problems. The internal governance of the Benedictines fulfills a 
second, interesting task for administrative organizations. Monastic governance promotes a 
pronounced service attitude, which is a central pillar in New Public Service theory. 
1. Embeddedness in common value systems 
As public sector institutions have done in the past (Horton, 2006, 2008), monasteries refer to 
common value systems in order to discuss possible solutions (McGrath, 2007). These value 
systems go far beyond “codes of best practices.” The Benedictine value system is based on 
three cornerstones: the Bible, the rule of St. Benedict, and the tradition of a particular 
monastery. Besides being based on the Bible, the rule of St. Benedict is the most important 
influence in the daily life of a monastery. It contains universal rules that circumscribe the 
service orientation of the monks. Hospitality or kindness is deeply grounded in the value 
system of the order (Regula Benedicti, 2006). St. Benedict’s writings reverberate with 
personal and economic interactions. The universal character of the rules prevents the 
communities from excessive bureaucracy and lengthy decision making. A common canon of 
values is able to reduce transaction costs. Monastic or canon law comes into effect only when 
problems arise. Oppositely, some public sector reforms put a major focus on contracting to 
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govern the provision of public services (Emery & Giauque, 2001). Such governance 
overemphasizes external control mechanisms, whereas the monastic approach has the 
potential of inspiring internal modes of coordination in public sector organizations. 
 To ensure that common value systems are suitable to guide the individual behavior of 
their members, the Benedictines build on careful selection and rigorous socialization 
processes. 
 Selection. Candidates for a monastic career go through a stringent selection process to 
test their suitability. The selection process is practically identical for every Benedictine 
monastery. There are four stages. First, every candidate, independent of application 
credentials, is welcome to live in a monastery for a few months. During these months, the 
candidate learns about the value system of the Benedictines and has the opportunity to ponder 
his motives carefully before becoming a full member. Thus, instead of preselecting 
employees, monasteries make use of self-selection. The decision to stay, in part, is handed 
back to the candidate. However, many aspirants do not fulfill the requirements. Second, a 
one-year probationary period follows. During this year, the novice learns about the 
foundations of the value system, the Holy Scripture, and church law. The other monks 
scrutinize his suitability. Third, there is a period called temporary profession follows, which 
lasts three years and contains a monastic apprenticeship - or the beginning of monastic 
studies. The underlying reason for the temporary profession is that individuals may change 
their minds. A profound education is required to provide a sound basis for decision making. 
Only after the first three steps are completed can full membership, or solemn profession, be 
celebrated. Solemn profession involves the unconditional commitment of both parties. In 
each case, the convent, which is the religious community of a monastery, has to give its 
blessing (Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation, 1986). Following the final oath to obey the 
Benedictine way of life, the new entrant becomes a full member of the monastic community 
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and has broad participation rights. Similar ideas have been proposed for public sector 
recruitment (Moynihan, 2008). It has been argued that the exaggerated employment of 
external incentives leads to negative selection effects; that is, it attracts candidates 
overwhelmingly fascinated by such benefits. Instead, human resources managers in public 
institutions should try to reap positive selection effects by focusing on candidates displaying 
high levels of public service motivation. Such motivation represents the desire to contribute 
genuinely to society and the common good and to have a true commitment to a public service 
ethos. 
 Socialization. In order to ensure living and working together successfully, careful 
socialization and the creation of an organizational identity is crucial. Three rules are essential. 
First, with respect to the Benedictine values, dialogue among the monks is fostered and any 
possible disagreements are addressed and solved. Second, a humble attitude is required, 
which does not indicate a subservient behavior but forgiveness, mutual respect, and openness 
to external suggestions. This attitude is termed “serving rather than ruling” (Eckert, 2000). It 
should appear not only inside a monastery but also in every relationship. Third, a monastic 
partnership depends on a life environment that is fulfilling. Regarding the monks’ 
professional lives, the Benedictines see work as a vocation and not a professional activity; 
work is considered part of one’s personal growth. This ethic has its source in the first 
millennium when St. Benedict saw work as a path to find inner peace (Kieser, 1987). 
 The Benedictines promote equality of treatment in daily life in order to integrate new 
members. From the very beginning, a novice is a part of the community; he participates in the 
same environment, including the daily routine, prayers, and meals. Being treated as an equal 
in a life and work community facilitates the development of common values (Wenger & 
Snyder, 2000). The Benedictines also use extensive learning programs in which their codex 
and knowledge are used to shape a common identity and facilitate the growth and 
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development of all members (Reiber, 2003). Apart from joint prayers, monasteries have 
implemented other learning practices, like daily readings at the communal dinner table. These 
readings deal with diverse topics, like the Bible, politics, philosophy, or the history of the 
Benedictines and the respective monastery. Besides education, these institutions strengthen 
the sense of belonging to something bigger than a particular monastery. The socialization 
lasts a lifetime and encourages an intrinsic transfer of the overall value system. According to 
psychological economics, the socialization principles of the Benedictines increase the 
purpose and the intrinsic motivation of each organizational member and thus the welfare of 
the whole organization (Deci, 1975; Frey & Osterloh, 2002). For public organizations, related 
approaches occur, although not this sophisticated. Ouchi (1977) presents the case of 
employees in a government’s foreign services department where socialization takes place 
inside professional groups and the internalization of norms and values is induced through 
education and senior colleagues behaving in a manner that is desired by the institution. 
2. Members’ voice 
The abbot carries the main responsibility for spiritual and economic concerns, represents the 
monastery in external affairs, delegates duties, and is in charge of the well-being of every 
member. The monks possess substantial participation rights and monitor the abbot and his 
officials (Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation, 1986; St. Ottilien Benediktinerkongregation, 
2004). 
 Participation. The convent consists of all padres and brothers with a solemn 
profession. Every one of these monks has equal rights and may vote in elections. The convent 
has four major tasks. First, the convent is responsible for decision making in important 
business affairs, for example, the acceptance of a novice as a full member or the expansion of 
the monastery through acquisition. Second, the convent democratically elects the abbot and 
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the employee representatives for the “advisory board,” or the consilium.9 Third, the convent 
evaluates whether a proposed prior is eligible. However, in order to make sure that the team 
in charge works in harmony, the abbot nominates and has the final say on which prior is 
selected. Fourth, members of the convent have the right to make requests and give opinions. 
Additionally, dialog among the monks is encouraged today. 
 Some New Public Management scholars consider voice to be a missing feature of the 
NPM reforms (Box, 1998; Gruening, 2001). The monastic governance demonstrates that 
voice enhances good governance. This is in line with the literature, which argues that voice 
should be a decisive part of NPM (Vigoda & Golembiewski, 2001). 
 Monitoring. Monasteries complement participation processes with internal 
monitoring processes. Beside predefined procedures, a separate advisory board (the 
consilium) counsels the abbot and his officials. They discuss contentious issues without 
having the final responsibility to make major business decisions. The consilium exclusively 
consists of insiders, that is, elected members of the convent (employee representatives) and 
nominated members of selected functions (Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation, 1986). 
 The substantial participation rights in monasteries can be regarded as a model for 
public sector organizations: padres and brothers have a voice in running the monastery. They 
can discipline the abbot and the management team (the officials) and thus prevent fraudulent 
behavior. Among other things, the monks are compensated for their (lifelong) tenure by 
receiving considerable voting rights and codetermination. They provide a strong incentive to 
invest in organization-specific knowledge (Osterloh & Frey, 2006). 
                                                 
9
 Recently, in some abbeys, the tenure of an abbot has been restricted to 12 years instead of lifelong tenure as 
before. 
 23 
B. External Governance Mechanisms 
The interplay between internal and external control mechanisms in Benedictine monasteries 
is of particular interest for public sector organizations. History shows that the internal control 
mechanisms of monasteries sometimes fail. For example, in situations where an abbot and the 
convent join in enriching themselves or simply do not care about the economic situation, 
external control becomes important. The organization of the external control in monasteries 
corresponds to insights in political economics. External control is hierarchically organized 
and consists of jurisdiction and periodic monitoring. Each monastery is embedded in a 
hierarchical structure of congregations, the Benedictine Confederation, and the Holy See. The 
congregation is the umbrella organization of the monasteries, in most cases, within a 
geographical region. It is responsible for monitoring the monasteries in its area of 
accountability. Abbots and some delegates of the respective houses represent each 
congregation. These representatives form the congregational chapter and elect the archabbot 
as president. The archabbot is recruited from an associated monastery to guarantee internal 
expertise. Each congregation is a part of the Benedictine Confederation. The Benedictine 
Confederation is an independent institution and facilitates the exchange of experiences 
between congregations and the Holy See, but it has no direct influence on the decision 
process. 
 Jurisdiction. Benedictine monasteries belong to the Catholic Church, are subject to 
its laws, and depend on the Holy See. Besides church and constitutional law, the legal norms 
of the congregation are binding for any particular monastery. The jurisdiction of the 
congregation is the first instance outside the monastery where disputes are settled. The 
congregation supervises the election of abbots and organizes the “visitations” of monasteries. 
They complement this law with their own statutes, the so-called Consuetudines (1991). 
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 Periodical monitoring. As the legal rules are very general with respect to economic 
issues, the so-called visitation is the most important tool for disciplining the convents. Every 
four to five years, delegates of the congregation visit a community to evaluate the condition 
of the monastery. The visitation considers not only the economic situation of a monastery and 
its fields of activity but also the spirit and the discipline of the community and its members, 
and it examines the personal relationships between the monks and their superiors and 
investigates abuses of authority (Schweizer Benediktinerkongregation, 1986). This institution 
focuses strongly on cultural and relational aspects. In addition to auditing, the visitors make 
use of questionnaires and interviews to detect any problems and failures. They analyze 
processes in-depth, ask specific questions, and refer to aspects, which pass unnoticed in the 
normal daily routine. Benno Malfèr, the Archabbot and first “visitator” of the Swiss 
Congregation, says “The most important function of ‘visitations’ is to induce reflection, and 
not to exercise control and discipline. Visitations contribute assistance and advance the 
exchange between monasteries.”10 
VI. WHAT CAN PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE LEARN FROM MONASTIC 
GOVERNANCE? 
Waves of public sector reform, in particular those represented by NPM, changed and still 
change the governance system of public organizations by introducing business-like, external 
incentives and focusing on market exchanges. The public sector may benefit from such 
business-like public sector reforms in some respects. Yet, the new alignment has also brought 
new problems. Wrong external incentives covering questionable performance criteria may be 
one important reason for such failures. Although new models were developed in order to 
address the shortcomings of early reforms, a strong connection to market orientation remains. 
In addition, most successors of NPM that are guiding today’s reforms say very little about the 
design of internal governance institutions, such as “voice,” loyalty, and trust. However, 
                                                 
10
 Interview with Archabbot Benno Malfèr, 07.11.2007 (translation by first author). 
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internal arrangements protect organization-specific investments, shape the image of the 
public sector employee as the steward of the taxpayer, or influence the belief that employees 
are willing to undertake efforts for a fixed compensation. Internal behavior incentives are 
most important in the public sector. 
 Here we can learn from monastic governance. Since medieval times, monasteries 
solved their governance problems by pursuing a two-fold strategy, which utilized both 
external and internal control elements. The monastery approach shows that internal 
arrangements help to avoid problems and facilitate control that is more effective. Monasteries 
build on generally known rules and conventions (e.g., the rule of St. Benedict and the 
tradition of a particular monastery). They supplement these rules with collective, internal 
institutions. Through careful selection and socialization practices, a shared understanding of 
the values is obtained and correct behavior encouraged. Instead of external incentives, the 
convent examines the preconditions of contenders and configures the processes and practices 
within the monastery. Members’ voices via the convent or the consilium strengthen checks 
and balances further. The governance of public sector organizations can learn from 
monasteries, which emphasize these internal mechanisms and demonstrate their usefulness. 
These historically evolved governance mechanisms are also in line with new developments in 
economic theories, for example, new proposals by psychological or political economics and 
embeddedness theory. Besides the plea to find new ways of solving agency problems and 
improving public reforms, the example of monasteries offers a variety of internal and external 
governance mechanisms that are worth examining in further research. 
VII. LIMITATIONS 
When considering what public sector organizations can learn from Benedictine monasteries, 
the resemblance promises interesting results. However, one should keep in mind existing 
differences, which can limit the application of the monastic approach. First, the extraordinary 
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relevance of faith and spirituality has to be mentioned. The biggest difference is that padres 
and brothers set up a life partnership (Reiber 2003). Work, rest, and leisure happen inside the 
same buildings and within the same community. The consequence is a stronger involvement 
and connection to the institution, which is perceived as a “life partnership” as opposed to 
public organizations. Second, monasteries sometimes are hot spots for gossip and mutual 
control, including lobbying and power games. This kind of behavior is not desirable and can 
cause severe damage on a personal and organizational level. Third, since monasteries build 
on strong and uniform value systems, individuals not only increase their social identity within 
the group, but groups also become more cohesive (Tajfel, 1981). The theory of groupthink 
hypothesizes that cohesive groups are most likely to experience groupthink—the belief in the 
inherent morality of the group and stereotypes of out-groups (Janis, 1972; Janis, 1982). 
Groupthink leads to the systematic and emotional devaluation of ideas, which were not 
discovered or launched within their own social collective (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). Fourth, 
social comparison theory hypothesizes that cohesive groups are more susceptible to expert 
power (Festinger, 1954), leading to dictatorship and abuse of power (Coleman, 1990). 
Finally, the life-long commitment to a monastery has to be considered. In public service, 
strong commitment is desirable but not in such an absolute way as in monastic institutions. 
While giving voice and developing loyalty, they (consciously or unconsciously) tend to build 
exit barriers. When exit costs are exorbitant, hindering people from leaving, negative 
outcomes, like discouragement, will occur (Hirschman, 1970). 
 For these reasons, public sector organizations have to balance the advantages and 
disadvantages of common value systems and commitment. On the one hand, value systems 
should be strong enough to select and socialize appropriate employees. On the other hand, 
value systems should be open enough to avoid dogmatism and unbalanced power. Public 
sector organizations can prevent groupthink by promoting the diversity of their employees 
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and their managers (Flap, 1988). Commitment should be fostered without creating exit 
barriers and constraining the employees too much. 
 Finally, it should be mentioned that we presented an idealized picture of monastic 
governance. Such an extreme way of life, as chosen by the Benedictine monks, can present 
serious drawbacks. For example, Goffman, (1961) depicts monasteries as “total institutions,” 
which may deprive an individual of his rights. Symbols like the monk’s cowl, rituals like the 
reception of a religious name, or the expropriation of a novice’s possessions would lead to a 
degeneration of the personality. Such concerns are not addressed in this paper. Although we 
argue that both institutions can learn from each other, we highlight some governance aspects 
in which the public sector can profit from the historic monastic organization of the 
Benedictine abbeys. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The monastery approach suggests that public sector organizations can prevent agency 
problems by complementing external discipline with internal behavioral incentives and by 
utilizing supportive external control mechanisms. Internal behavioral incentives refer to 
intrinsically motivated actors who will not slavishly react to external incentives. Internal 
arrangements facilitate improved control through voice in the form of democratic rights of 
participation and through loyalty and trust expressed in the protection of organization-
specific investments. Democratic, supportive external control mechanisms refer to self-
determined actors who are interested in improving their self-governance. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Development of Public Sector Reforms 
 1st Reform Generation Beyond NPM 1 Beyond NPM 2 Informed Extension 
 New Public Management New Public Service Integrated Governance Monastic Governance 
Primary Theory Agency theory Democratic theory Agency theory 
& Weberianism 
Psychological economics 
Responsibility Customers Citizens Citizens & Customers Society 
Role of Government Monitoring & Steering Brokering & Serving  Improving Serving 
Motivation of Agents Extrinsic Intrinsic  Extrinsic & Intrinsic Intrinsic 
Primary Governance  
Mechanisms 
Controlling 
monetary external 
incentives 
Building coalitions, 
representation of interests 
Controlling 
(non)monetary external 
incentives, goal setting 
Internal incentives 
(autonomy) and supportive  
external incentives 
Source: based on Denhardt & Denhardt 2000, p. 554   
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Table 2. Survival and Closure of Monasteries11 
Reason for Closures 
 
Number of 
Benedictine 
Monasteries 
 
in % 
Average 
Lifetime  
in Years 
No closure 26 17,2% 277 
Nonagency problem-related closures    
Voluntary closure 
External institutional factors 
6 
79 
4% 
52,3% 
540 
568 
 85 56,3% - 
Agency problem related closures    
Mismanagement 20 13,2% 387 
Change into other organizational form 11 7,3% 313 
Control failure  9 6% 325 
 40 26,5% - 
Total closures 125 82,8% - 
 
 
Figure 1a/b. Absolute number of Benedictine monasteries and collegiate churches over 
time/Kaplan-Meier survival estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 More information and the data can be made available by the first author (emilinauen@access.uzh.ch). See 
also Rost et. al (2009) 
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Figure 2. Governance Mechanisms of the Benedictines 
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